TRENTON – Two Middle Township residents, sentenced in 2013 to five years’ probation for various animal cruelty offenses, had their appeals rejected Nov. 6 by the state Appellate Court in an unpublished opinion.
Dawn Scheld was convicted of two counts of third-degree animal cruelty; fourth-degree conspiracy to commit animal cruelty; fourth-degree sale of an animal with a contagious disease; and fourth-degree hindering prosecution.
Scheld was found guilty of animal cruelty linked to the deaths of two puppies, and a count of hindering apprehension when she tried to hide four more puppies when officials searched her home; and conspiracy on animal cruelty and selling diseased dogs.
Scheld contended, on appeal:
- The animal cruelty statute was unconstitutional, and that criminal charges should have been dismissed.
- Admission of other crime evidence was “grossly prejudicial and denied” her a fair trial.
- Testimony of Dr. Michael Moyer, the state’s expert in veterinary and shelter medicine “exceeded the proper scope for expert witnesses.”
- There was “insufficient evidence to support (her) conviction for animal cruelty, sale of infectious animal or hindering beyond reasonable doubt.”
Leroy Thomas Jr. was convicted of fourth-degree conspiracy to commit animal cruelty.
He argued:
- There was “insufficient evidence to support…conviction for conspiracy to commit animal cruelty in violation of (a statute) beyond a reasonable doubt.”
- He was denied a fair trial.
- Forfeiture ruling violated his constitutional rights.
Both were found guilty in October 2013 in a bench trial held before Superior Court Judge Raymond Batten.
The case became public in December 2010 after officers of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (SPCA) traced the sale of sick puppies sold by the couple to their property where 61 caged dogs were found living in squalid conditions.
Scheld, via her SOS Canine Rescue and Rehabilitation, sought to save dogs from shelters in North Carolina that euthanized them. For that reason she harbored many dogs on her Goshen property.
A condition of the couple’s probation was a prohibition from owning or possessing domesticated animals. Additionally, any interest they had in animals seized from their property was forfeited, and they were ordered to pay penalties and assessments, from which they appealed.
The Appellate Court noted that, in July 2010, SPCA started an investigation into the shelter after Christina Guzman bought a dog from them in the belief it was healthy and had been given all necessary vaccinations.
She learned from her veterinarian that the dog had a contagious skin infection. Fearing other animals there may have also been infected, she contacted the SPCA.
Between July and December 2010, Theresa Cooper, an SPCA investigator, inspected the shelter and saw dogs living in “unsanitary and poorly maintained pens that, at times, lacked drinking water.” The court noted she also observed animals with various health issues. On seeing those, she advised Scheld to get them immediate medical care.
Shortly afterward, one of those sick dogs had to be euthanized by a veterinarian because it had parvovirus “that, within days, killed the two other dogs as well.”
“Scheld ignored those instructions and the health hazards, and the unsanitary conditions at the shelter continued unabated,” the court wrote.
As to Scheld’s contention that the law was unconstitutional and vague, since it did not define “torture” or “torment,” the court added, “Absent legislative intent to the contrary, however, these terms should be given their ordinary meaning.”
Scheld claimed she “lacked the mens rea (or guilty intent) required for conviction. We disagree,” the court wrote.
It added that she had been notified on numerous occasions of serious medical and environmental dangers to the dogs. “Despite these warnings, defendants failed for nearly six months to remedy the unhealthy, painful and unsanitary condition of their shelter,” the court wrote.
Further, the court rejected “the arguments that the animal cruelty statute is unconstitutionally vague on its face or as applied in this case.”
She also argued that Batten erred in allowing SPCA testimony, which should have been excluded. The court noted the trial court applied rules of evidence “to preclude evidence that defendants had both previously pled guilty to animal cruelty charges related to other animals on another property.”
The rule provides that “(s)uch evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.”
The court discerned “no abuse of discretion by the trial judge because the evidence concerning the SPCA investigation was intrinsic and relevant to the conspiracy count. Both Scheld and Thomas were ultimately convicted of that conspiracy count. Moreover, we see little chance of prejudice to either Scheld or Thomas because this was a bench trial and the trial judge was more than capable of using the evidence for its limited and appropriate purpose.”
To Scheld’s contention that Moyer’s testimony exceeded the scope of an expert, the court countered, “Neither defense counsel objected to that testimony during the bench trial. Moreover, the trial judge specifically stated that the expert could not render a legal opinion.”
Thomas argued that his due process rights were violated by failure to disclose exculpatory information. That focused on an audiotape recording of a conversation between Scheld and Cooper that was provided to him the day prior to the trial. The trial court, however, barred admission of that recording.
He countered that parts of that recording were made part of the record. The judge did not rely on that recording, but on Cooper’s testimony of a conversation she and Scheld had about two dogs that exhibited parvovirus.
“We find that the trial judge made specific findings of fact that satisfied the elements for each of the crimes for which Scheld and Thomas were convicted,” the court wrote. It added that the judge’s review of evidence at the trial was “based on sufficient and substantial credible evidence.”
Thomas also noted the forfeiture of the dogs was “not favored under the law” and that the state did not bring forfeiture action within 90 days, which took place in December 2010.
The court found “no error in the trial court’s order of forfeiture.”
