Appellate Court: No Racial Motivation Behind Juror’s Excuse

TRENTON – Markees Pruitt’s case, for which he is serving time at South Woods State Prison, was argued before the state Appellate Division Nov. 12 which delivered its decision Nov. 26. His nine-year sentence stands, although the minimum time he must serve could possibly free him in early 2016.
Pruitt’s initial appeal was published here May 1, 2013.
Pruitt was convicted in a 13-count indictment for May and June 2009 drug sales within 500 feet of public housing and possession and distribution charges in Wildwood.
He appealed in April 2013 maintaining the Cape May County Prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse the only qualified African-American juror was racially motivated. The Appellate Court remanded the case to trial court. Another Criminal Division judge heard the case, since the original judge had been assigned to another division.
Arguing the case for Prosecutor Robert L. Taylor was Assistant Prosecutor Gretchen A. Pickering. For the defendant, Assistant Deputy Public Defender Jason A. Coe argued Pruitt’s cause.
The Law Division held a hearing and found that during jury selection at Pruitt’s criminal trial, “the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove the only African-American juror did not ‘disclose a constitutional violation.’” Pruitt appealed from the July 9, 2013 remand order.
“Defendant was on trial for multiple counts of illegal drug distribution, and the state’s case was based on evidence of a series of drug purchases from defendant by undercover police officers.
“Defendant is African-American, and there were only two African-Americans in the jury pool. One African-American was excused for cause, and the prosecutor later excused the other, who was Juror 13, using a peremptory challenge.
“As soon as the prosecutor used the peremptory challenge, defense counsel asked the trial judge to conduct a hearing pursuant to (Gilmore, a state case). The judge denied the request because the prosecutor had only excused one African-American juror. On appeal, we concluded that the judge’s decision was contrary to the principles set forth in (Osorio, another state case), which stated…standards for determining whether a defendant has presented a prima facie case in mounting a (Gilmore) challenge.”
At the remand hearing, the judge required the prosecutor “to explain his reasons for striking Juror 13.
“The prosecutor stated that he asked that she be excused because she worked at the Woodbine Developmental Center…The prosecutor recalled that, during (jury selection), the juror told the court that she took care of men at the center. The prosecutor told the second judge that he typically would use peremptory challenges to excuse social workers, because he felt they were too likely to be sympathetic to the accused, and he perceived Juror 13’s job to be akin to that of a social worker.
“The prosecutor also stated that over the years his office had prosecuted a number of both residents and employees from the center for drug offenses and other crimes, and as a result, he always struck jurors who worked there.”
Pruitt’s defense counsel “did not compare Juror 13 to any of the other jurors whom the prosecutor excused or did not excuse. In other words, he did not offer any specific evidence that the prosecutor’s explanation was unreasonable, not genuine, or a pretext for discrimination,” the court wrote.
The judge noted that recall of Juror 13 could not be done. He also “evaluated the prosecutor’s explanation and found that it was neutral, plausible, case specific, and not a ‘ruse’ to cover up discrimination. He concluded that the defense had not carried its burden of demonstrating a (Gilmore) violation.”
Because the second judge heard the prosecutor’s explanation “first-hand, we also owe some deference to his ability to gauge the credibility of the explanation,” the court wrote.
The court also reviewed transcripts of jury selection, and “We find no abuse of the judge’s discretion in reaching his conclusion. We agree with the second judge that the prosecutor’s explanation was reasonable, related to the case, and not obviously pretextual. We cannot say it was unreasonable for the prosecutor to excuse a juror whose job he perceived as being akin to social work and some of whose clients may have been prosecuted by his office,” the court continued.
While the judge did not compare Juror 13 to other jurors, “on the other hand, defense counsel did not argue that there were any other allegedly situated jurors whom the prosecutor did not excuse.”
The court excused a juror who worked at a drug treatment facility and who expressed “empathy” for Pruitt.
It also stated “it was defendant’s burden to prove a Gilmore violation by a preponderance of the evidence.” That means Pruitt bore the burden to specify to trial court, at the time of the remand hearing, which allegedly comparable jurors the prosecutor failed to strike.”
In failing to raise those issues during remand, Pruitt “deprived the prosecutor of the opportunity to explain why he did not strike the allegedly comparable jurors. The court noted Pruitt’s additional appellate arguments “are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
“In summary, we find no abuse of discretion or other error in the remand court’s decision. Thus, defendant’s conviction stands.”
For previous coverage, go to:
– Was Juror’s Exclusion Racially Motivated? Appellate Court Orders Hearing: http://goo.gl/6ZAd91